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Al-Qaeda- Still going strong
by Syed Saleem Shahzad
Today the Afghanistan government seems to have come around the point
that it is better to have the Taliban as part of the government than
having it firmly aligned with Al-Qaeda. President Karzai has gone to the
extent of holding talks with their leaders to invite them into the
mainstream and contest elections in an effort to wean them away from Al-Qaeda.
While the Taliban and the Afghan administration of President Hamid
Karzai play political football with the idea of peace talks, the
stumbling block remains al-Qaeda, which is firmly opposed to any
dialogue unless it can gain something for itself. Over the past few
weeks, the Taliban have responded positively to Karzai's offer of talks,
but just when it appeared there might be progress, there's a setback.
Speaking on his return from the United States, Karzai said that he was
ready to meet Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the
leader of another insurgency group, Hezb-e-Islami, for peace talks aimed
at sharing power.
But Qari Mohammad Yousuf, a Taliban spokesman, was quoted by Reuters as
saying that peace talks with Kabul would not take place as long as the
more than 50,000 foreign troops remained in the country. "The Karzai
government is a dummy government. It has no authority so why should we
waste our time and effort?" Yousuf was quoted as saying. Previously, the
Taliban have said that they would talk without preconditions, and they
could well revert to this position.
Coincidentally, Karzai made his offer hours after one of the biggest
bomb attacks in six years killed 30 people in Kabul. Karzai said that
President George W Bush and Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary
general, had both supported the idea of peace talks when he met them in
the US. Karzai said he would allocate some government posts to the
Taliban and that both Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar could stand in elections
scheduled for 2009, if they wanted power.
Although Karzai has offered talks before, this was the first time since
the Taliban's ouster in 2001 that the Washington-anointed leader had
gone as far
as to effectively legitimize the insurgency. Recently, several top
Taliban commanders met again in the Pakistani city of Quetta to hold
talks with the Afghan government through Afghan tribal elders acting as
go-betweens.
These talks are claimed by the Karzai government as proof of debate
among Taliban commanders for peace. However, what is overlooked is the
ideological strength of al-Qaeda, which has once again wrested control
of the hearts and minds of the Taliban, at least in southeastern
Afghanistan. And until al-Qaeda's leaders are drawn into the talks, any
other dialogue is bound to fail.
Mushahid Hussain Syed, chairman of the foreign relations committee of
the Pakistani Senate and also the powerful secretary general of the
ruling Pakistan Muslim League, said: "Only a year ago when I made the
proposal that if Mullah Omar is too hard-line to talk too, and the
Afghan government should start negotiations with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
the Afghan government was so upset that it officially protested to
Pakistan. But I am happy that now Mr Karzai himself has endorsed the
same proposal."
There is a delayed realization in the Western camp that the Taliban are
a reflection of Afghanistan's majority Pashtun population and that their
brand of Islam in fact blends strongly with conservative Pashtun
traditions. Even after the Taliban defeat in 2001 by the US and its
allies, that same brand of Islam is reflected in Afghan court decisions
and in many other matters dealt with by the present administration.
The upshot is acceptance that the Taliban should be accommodated
politically as well, yet the Western coalition still does not have the
stomach to talk with al-Qaeda, which is exerting its influence from the
Pakistani tribal areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan.
People forget that the reason Afghanistan was invaded in the first place
was because of the sanctuary that the Taliban offered al-Qaeda. The
majority of Afghanistan's tribal and clerical councils recommended
expelling Osama bin
Laden after September 11, 2001, but al-Qaeda's influence prevailed.
The US and Pakistan, as partners in the "war on terror", made numerous
efforts to split the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and at times they succeeded.
Notably, there was major disagreement on strategies between the Taliban
and al-Qaeda in 2006, which led to many al-Qaeda leaders leaving the
Waziristan and Afghanistan. And this year, a Pakistani-sponsored
massacre was carried out in South Waziristan against Uzbek militants by
Pakistani Taliban commander Haji Nazeer. Prominent al-Qaeda commanders
were expelled from the area, yet after a few months al-Qaeda had
regained its influence and all Pakistan Taliban groups and al-Qaeda
members are fighting side-by-side against the Pakistani armed forces.
If the al-Qaeda factor is to be neutralized, the group needs to be
engaged, just as attempts are being made to embrace the Taliban. When
Prince Turki al-Faisal (now ambassador to the United States) was the
Saudi intelligence chief, the kingdom kept its channels of dialogue with
al-Qaeda open, even after September 11, by using the Taliban leadership.
And recently, Saudi Arabia made a fresh approach at dialogue with al-Qaeda
by sending an envoy to speak with it in North Waziristan. These talks
did not make too much progress, but al-Qaeda is certainly looking for
some kind of "amnesty" for itself. Until this happens, the Taliban's
commanders in southwestern Afghanistan might win some breathing space,
but there can be no guarantee of any lasting political settlement in the
region. |
