|
|
 |
|
|
| |
BEWARE IF SPIES, SABOTEURS
AND SLANDER MONGERS
|
| |
The Mitorkhin Archives-II as projected by a
semi-historian scholar Christopher Andrew of Britain, once again use the
so-called KGB archives, acquired from a double agent Vasili Mitrokhin
for cheap muck-rafring. Among many Asian leaders, they have singled out
some of he great Indian leaders as targets of a slander campaign. The
spies, saboteurs and slander mongers from both the Western world and the
now nearly dead Communist world, have been at this game before and after
India’s Independence.
There is nothing surprising in this continuous
misinformation war against the largest democracy in the world. Both the
so-called socialist world and the powerful capitalist world, sought to
turn India into a client state, to be gradually and conveniently turned
into an economic colony, but failed.
Espionage, like prostitution, is one of the oldest
shady professions in the world but more pitiable are those who take the
words of known spies and prostitutes as deliverers of moral judgment on
those who refused to bow to their malicious string pullers. No doubt
many of these indomitable leaders of countries like India had to pay the
price through political assassinations. The violent deaths of many
Indian leaders, belonging to different schools of ideology, remained
shrouded in mystery despite much political furors and setting up of
commissions of inquiry to get to the truth of the assassinations and the
real identity of the assassins.
It has to be remembered that books of slander, mostly
brought out from the Western countries as pseudo histories, based in
reality on forged and doctored information, have only one purpose they
try to cover up the assassins and saboteurs and malign carefully chosen
leaders of target nations, who are no more and cannot defend themselves.
The preliminary statement of this investigatory story
by the DANFES is necessary to put it in correct perspective for further
debate and discussions and provoking those who consider their temporary
political gain and loyalties above the permanent truths to think again
about their hysteric reactions to the creations of the sick minds from
the countries of the West. They were also the mother countries of the
competing 20th Century espionage systems, through which they sought to
maintain their domination of the Asian and African countries in
particular form where the nationalist struggles and the wheels of
history had forced them to relinquish their colonial strangleholds.
One has to understand that after the end of World
War-II in particular, and during and after the cold war, the
super-powers and their allies and protégés continued to conduct their
spy wars as precursors to proxy wars, limited wars, invasions of smaller
and weaker countries and the more dreaded instant wars under the banner
of terrorism of all varieties and colours.
The Soviet Union, China, the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Israel and nearest home India’s nearest
neighbour Pakistan have acquired a special place on the world espionage
map. They are countries which have made sabotage, disinformation wars
and terrorism as instruments of their policy of threat, blackmail and
sabotage against countries whose lands or loyalty they seek to acquire
by force.
Of course, there is no country, especially in Asia
and Africa, which is not constantly the target of the CIA, KGB, Mossad
and ISI like spy agencies. In India, all such agencies, including the
Chinese and some East European spy networks, had been active, long
before the country’s Independence. Just on the eve of the breaking out
of World War-II, when India was still a part of the British empire,
there were countywide raids here to arrest German nationals who had been
residing in this country for years. They were spies planted in India by
Hitler’s Germany, long before the war started.
It was also a well known fact that the mother of the
CIA was also originally born in India in the jungles of Assam during the
world War-II under the aegis of the South-East Asia Command, led by
British and American intelligence agents as OSS, to spy on the Japanese
and the Indian National Army, both then on the side of the Axis powers
led by Germany against the Allied powers led by Great Britain.
At that point of the beginning of world War-II, the
Soviet Union was part of the military alliance of the Axis powers to
begin with, before Hitler turned on the Soviet Union itself.
At that point, for strategic information, which
flowed earlier to Moscow through the German, Japanese and Italian spies
of the Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo regimes of militarists, the soviet
Union had to quickly shift gears and both the KGB and the fraternal
communist parties around Europe and the world had to join the “war
effort” which originally was considered by many of them, including the
communist party in India, “not their war.”
The historical fact had to be taken note of that then
the war on the side of the Allies finally acquired the character of
non-fascist forces, including the Soviet Union, fighting against the
fascists, including Germany, Italy, Japan and several Quislings, fascist
spies and agents who had turned into rulers of puppet regimes set up by
Hitler to subvert their nationalism and democratic structures.
Then it turned into a “peoples’ war” for the
Communist movement all over the world. It must also be remembered that
the Comintern and the Communist movement led by Lenin and Stalin was an
internationalist doctrine in which geo-political boundaries of nations
did not matter at all while going ahead with the establishment of the
“dictatorship of the proletariat.” Therefore, the Communists all over
the world were expected to come to the aid of Moscow in every way,
including the supply of strategic information.
The Indian Communists had to change from neutrals to
supporters of the “people’s war” after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union.
When the Axis powers were finally defeated and the Allies, now including
the Soviet Union too, came out triumphant, the espionage networks of the
powerful Allies leaders, and the very special strategic information
relationship between the Communist parties around the world emerged.
These circumstances, eventually, resulted in the KGB
and the OSS successor, the CIA, steadily emerging as the world’s great
spy networks. The position had been earlier occupied by the British MI-6
and other UK secret services, set up by Britain over the years to pursue
its Imperial policy of divide-and-rule all over its great sprawling
empire in Asia, Africa, North America and Australia.
And then the world became the happy hunting ground of
the three great Spy mothers, the KGB the CIA and the MI-6. The three
witches, between themselves, steadily built up their own governments
within their sponsoring governments and carved up the world into their
sometimes collaborating and sometimes clashing evil empires of espionage
and sabotage.
Not only India, but all the former colonial nations
struggling for freedom from the colonial powers in Asia, Africa and
America, were the victims of he machinations of these evil empires which
divided countries, tried to destroy the images of their new leaders and
srwed the seeds of violence and prejudice among the nationalities whose
coming together would be a challenge to their economic domination in
future.
That was the scenario of the swift rise of the CIA,
the KGB and of course the MI-6 in the cold war era when battles were
fought through cunning, crookery and Quislings, secretly and maliciously
to sow instability and conflict in the target nations.
|
| |
The
KGB
Time Bomb Explodes
Spy
exposes and exposures by foreign agencies and their masters and servants
are not new to India. Since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, there were
efforts by many countries of the Left and the Right to plant spies,
pliable media persons and gullible politicians to malign and discredit
Indian leaders of almost every political party from the Indian National
Congress, the Jana Sangh, its successor the BJP, the Socialist Party of
India in its various forms and finally the Communist Party of India and
the Communist Party of India (Marxist) themselves.
What was always interesting was the timing of such
exposures. The motive was always obvious. These time bombs were targeted
against the “enemy parties” to favour “fraternal parties” to gain
control of India and pave the way for one or another kind of foreign
intervention. The old colonial powers were sore that the unity and
determination of India under the nationalist movement called the Indian
National Congress had compelled them to give up their colonial
stranglehold of India.
The Soviets were sore that the non-aligned movement
had failed to help spread their unequivocal domination of the non
capitalist world and the Chinese, who emerged as fast growing super
power in their own right, perceived India moving into the capitalist
camp.
Most of these perceptions were erroneous and were
based on a crass failure to really understand the intrinsic democratic
values and the power of the Indian people to face challenges and despite
some of its weakling and power-crazy politicians, to sustain themselves
and ensure India’s steady march towards democratic political and
economic progress.
Whenever India was about to embark on important steps
ahead, such exposes suddenly exploded, generally from London, New York
and sometimes even from Beijing where once Li Shao Chih had called
“Nehru, Nasser and Tito… the Biggest Enemies of Communism.”
This time the Mitrokhin Archive II was also planned
right in the wake of the planned leaks from the similar expose work by
Gauhar Ayub Khan of Pakistan, the son of the late Pak dictator Ayub
Khan, mud-slinging on Indian Army and political leaders. These came on
the eve of India’s breakthroughs in economic and international relations
and ahead of the series of important state elections.
The hysteric sections of some of the Indian political
parties need to take these so called merchants of truths manufactured in
the KGB and CIA factories, not just with a pinch of salt, but with at
least a grain of grey matter.
So, in this investigation, it is important to know
what is the salt and pepper in the KGB dirty bomb, thrown at India by
the dead Vasili Mitrokhin and by living Chriszopher Andrew, his
successor. Perhaps the most detailed introduction to Mitrokhin Archive
II was presented by the Pioneer in its September 25 issue. Courtesy the
Pioneer, we present experts from that report as it was published in that
newspaper, before presenting the Indian reactions to them. This is
followed by two reports on Spies in the Himalayas, a CIA expose
published in 2003 with a view to promoting a balanced approach to the
subject. Of course the reactions, to be presented later, of the various
political sections were along the expected lines of one-up-manship and
would come later in this investigation.
|
| |
The KGB CACHE
India was up for sale, says a sensational book based on classified
documents smuggled out of Soviet Union by KGB agent Vasili Mitrokhin in
1992. The book, slated to be released in India on October 12, shows up
Indira Gandhi’s India as the most penetrated nation by any foreign
agency, with everyone from Ministers to influential journalists to her
all-time ally CPI being on the payroll of Soviet Intelligence. Secret
funds amounting to millions, forged CIA conspiracy documents reaching
PMO, covertly funded mass demonstrations and mid-road handover of
currency suitcases, the KGB never had it so good in any other NATO
nation.
How the
story unfolded
Vasili Mitrokhin is the legendry
KGB defector to Britain who gave the world “unprecedented and
unrestricted” access to one of the World’s most secret and intensely
guarded archives-that of the foreign Intelligence arm of the KGB-the
First Chief Director (FCD). The FBI calls the material brought out of
Soviet Union by Mitrokhin in 1992 “the most complete and extensive
intelligence ever received from any source.”
Mitrokhin and his family was
exfiltrated by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SSI) from Russia
in 1992. Details of the operations are not known as they are classified.
But, along with him came a mine of information for the West in six
Suitcases containing conscious notes the man had taken daily for 12
years-of top-secret KGB files going as far back as 1918.
Mitrokhin’s documents contain
KGB’s operation all over the world, including the US, Europe, Asia,
Africa and Middle-East, not to mention unforgivable details of its
Afghanistan operations.
Over a decade later, Intelligence
agencies around the world are still pursuing leads from his archive. The
papers contain material from KGB files which Russian foreign
intelligence is still anxious to keep from public view. The archive
covers almost the whole of the Cold War, most of it still highly
classified in Moscow. The originals of some files transcribed by
Mitrokhin may no longer exit. In 1989, most of the huge multi-volume
file on dissident Andrei Sakharov, earlier branded Public Enemy No. 1 by
KGB, was destroyed. Soon afterwards, Kryuchkov shredded all files on
other dissidents. Mitrokhin’s notes on them may now be all that
survives.
Born in 1922, Mitrokhin began his
career as a foreign intelligence officer in 1948. He grew up on
conspiracy theories floated by Stalin, the cultural barbarism of his
successor Khruschev, the persecution of the likes of Boris Pasternak,
Nobel Laureate and author of the all-time great Dr. Zhivago, the
bloodhunt of dissidents by Stalin’s brutal security chief Pavlovich
Beria who, incidentally, was the third KGB chief to be put to the
gallows though not for being a serial rapist of underage girls as this
would have tarnished the KGB reputation worldwide.
After the Soviets compelled
Pasternak to return the Nobel Prize for Literature, Mitrokhin was so
outraged that he sent an anonymous letter of protest to the
Literaturanaya Gazeta. Though he wrote this letter with his left hand to
disguise his handwriting, he remained anxious as he knew how the KGB
deployed its resources to track down anonymous letter-writers. He was
even worried that by licking the gum on the back of the envelope before
sealing it, he had made it possible for his saliva to be identified by a
KGB Laboratory.
Mitrokhin’s Disenchantment with
the Soviet regime had another stop that he termed a “personal affront.”
As an ardent fan of the famous Kirov Ballet, he was outraged to discover
that the FCD planned to maim the ballet’s star dancer and defector,
Rudolf Nureyev. Though this plan could not be put into action and
Nureyev died due to AIDS, Mitrokhin could never forget how a Soviet
jewel would have been injured beyond repair by a dissidence-obsessed
KGB.
Other than this, Mitrokhin worked
and saw the KGB at close quarters under Beria, Shelepin, Semichastney
and Yuri Andropov, all of whom where highly ambitious, mostly
unscrupulous and largely ruthless in their running of the organization.
The brutal crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Prague Spring
of 1968 and the outrageous secret files he stumbled upon on the
Afghanistan War, moulded Mitrokhin’s viewpoint that Soviet Union was on
an irreparable path of no-return.
His opportunity to document the
iniquities of the Soviet system came in June 1972 when the FCD
headquarters was moved from Lubyanka to Yasenevo. For the next 12 years,
his assignment was to check and seal around 3,00,000 files in the FCD
archives prior to their transfer to the new headquarters. It was a mine
of classified information he became privy to. As the co-author of
Mitrokhin Archives, Christopher Andrew puts it: “Few KGB officers apart
from Mitrokhin spent as much time reading, let alone nothing, foreign
intelligence files. Outside the FCD archives, only the most senior
officers shared his unrestricted access and none had the time to read
more than a fraction of the material noted down by him.”
Mitrokhin spent every Monday,
Tuesday and Friday in his Yasenevo office. On Wednesdays, he went to
Lubyanka to work on FCD’s secret files, those of Directorate S which ran
illegals – KGB officers an agents, most of Soviet nationality, working
under deep cover abroad disguised as foreign citizens. Once reviewed by
Mitrokhin, each batch of files was placed in sealed containers
transported to Yasenevo on Thursday morning, accompanied by Mitrokhin
who checked them on arrival.
When Mitrokhin set out to compile
his forbidden FCD archives, he was paranoid. For weeks, he tried to
commit names, codenames and key facts from the files to memory and
transcribe them every evening at home. Abandoning it as too slow, he
began taking notes in minuscule handwriting on scraps, which he crumpled
up and threw into his wastepaper basket. Each evening, he retrieved
these notes and smuggled them out concealed in his shoes. With the
Yasenevo guards limiting searches to occasional inspections of
briefcases, he became confident enough to take out notes in his jacket
and trouser pockets. Not once in the 12 years was Mitrokhin frisked.
He hid these papers every night
under his mattress at his Moscow flat. On weekends, he took them to his
dacha 36 km from Moscow and typed as many as possible. He hid the
typescripts in a milk-churn which he buried below the floor.
The dacha sat on raised
foundations, giving Mitrokhin room to crawl beneath the floorboard, dig
a hole with a short-handled spade and deposit his papers there in his
milk churn. He frequently crawled through dog and cat feces and,
sometimes, disturbed rats while digging. When the milk churn was full,
he began concealing his typescripts in a tin clothes-boiler. Eventually,
his archive filled two tin trunks and two aluminum cases, all buried
under the dacha.
Mitrokhin’s most anxious moment
came when he once arrived at his dacha to find a stranger hiding in the
attic. He was reminded how a friend of writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who
had called unexpectedly at his dacha while he was away and surprised two
KGB officers in the attic searching for subversive manuscripts, was
beaten up. To his relief, however, the intruder in his attic turned out
to be a squatter.
During summer holidays Mitrokhin
worked at a second family dacha near Penza, carrying his notes in a
haversack and dressing up as a peasant so as to not attract attention.
Despite Gorbachev’s call for
glasnost in 1985, Mitrokhin knew that the Soviet system would never
allow the truth to come out. So, he began thinking of ways of
transporting his archive to the West.
First he thought of, but
soon abandoned the idea, of flying out in a micro light aircraft from a
KGB sports club, much like the West German Matthias Rust had done by
crossing the Finnish border into Soviet airspace and flying undetected
for 450 miles before landing in Red Square.
He also considered getting a
position on the local Party committee that issued permits for foreign
travel and book himself and family on a cruise from Leningrad to Odessa
in the Black Sea. He abandoned this idea because of the difficulty of
separating himself from the Soviet tour group.
Finally, after the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, in March 1992, Mitrokhin boarded a train from
Moscow to newly independent Baltic republic. With him, he took a case on
wheels, containing bread, sausages and drinks on top, clothes
underneath, and at the bottom, a sample of his notes. The next day he
arrived unannounced at the British embassy and asked for “someone in
authority.”
A young woman diplomat received
him. Mitrokhin was impressed by her fluency in Russian and the warm
English tea she offered him while going through his files. Mitrokhin
told her they were a small part of a big personal collection, which
included material on KGB operations in Britain.
On his next trip to the embassy
on April 9, Mitrokhin brought 2,000 typed pages that he had removed from
the hiding place beneath his dacha. Showing his Communist Party card and
KGB pension certificate as identity proof, he handed over his bulky
consignment to secret service agents and spent the day answering queries
about himself, his archive and how he had compiled it. It was decided
that he would return to the embassy two months later to discuss
arrangements for a visit to Britain. Early May, the Moscow SIS reported
to London that Mitrokhin would leave Moscow on an overnight train on
June 10. On June 11, he arrived in the Baltic capital carrying a
rucksack containing more material. Most of his day with SIS officers was
spent discussing plans for him to be debriefed in Britain.
On September 7, escorted by SIS,
Mitrokhin arrived in England for the first time. While being debriefed
at anonymous houses in London and the countryside, Mitrokhin took the
final decision to leave Russia for Britain, and agreed with SIS on
arrangements to exfiltrate him, his family and his archive.
On October 13, he was infiltrated
back into Russia to make final arrangements for his departure. On
November 7, 1992, the 75th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,
Mitrokhin arrived with his family in the Baltic capital. A few days
later, he arrived in London to begin a new life in Britain. “It was a
bittersweet moment. Mitrokhin was safe and secure for the first time
since he had begun assembling his secret archive eighteen years
previously, but at the same time he felt a sense of bereavement at
separation from a homeland he knew he would probably never see again.
The bereavement passed, though his attachment to Russia remained,”
writes Andrew.
Mitrokhin continued to be a
British citizen till his death on January 24, 2004. For most of his life
in Britain, he remained publicity shy and refused to come to the
forefront though his wine parties for friends were quite popular. Using
his senior citizen’s rail card to travel the length and breadth of the
country, he saw more of Britain than most natives.
Since 1992 till his death on
January 24, 2004, he spent several days a week working on his archive,
typing up the remaining handwritten notes, and responding to questions
about his archive from Intelligence services from five continents.
When one Mr. Vasili Mitrokhin
walked out of Russia along with his family and a six-carriage cache full
of classified documents that Russian Intelligence is still cagey about,
little did the Congress or the Leftists in India realize how this
predominantly West triumph over the Red Dragon’s covert
trans-continental penetration would put them on the mat.
Thirteen years later, as the
Mitrokhin archives tell you in a sequel book co-authored by Christopher
Andrew, the KGB spent unprecedented time, roubles an agents on funding
the Communist Party of India, propelling it to align with Indira Gandhi
through her good, bad and ugly days and how the left took instructions
from the KGB on the best ways to strategies their stay in the power
portals of India – right from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru to that of
Rajiv Gandhi.
According to the book, the first
man the KGB’s well-entrenched network picked up to be worked upon was
none other than Nehru’s Defence Minster Krishna Menon, a firebrand
leftists. Agents in New Delhi were specifically instructed to engage in
intense operations to strengthen Menon’s profile in India and work upon
his personal popularity. The “work” paid dividends when the Defence
Minster switched to buying Soviet wares and flying machines for the
Armed Forces instead of going on shopping expeditions to America.
However, the Soviet hopes that
Menon would succeed Nehru were dashed when he resigned in the wake of
the Chinese invasion and soon got eclipsed on the political firmament.
After toying with managing
Gulzarilal Nanda and Lal Bahadur Shastri as foils to the right-wing
Morarji Desai’s possible ascendance to the top slot, the Soviets finally
homed in on Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi when Congress leaders chose
her as Shastri’s successor after his sudden death in 1966.
Indira was codenamed VANO by the
KGB and a multi-pronged strategy was put in place to serenade her
whenever possible, to feed her on CIA conspiracy theories, l manage and
create her political allies, like the CPI, and even fund her election
candidates.
It was during the Indira regime
that the KGB best flowered and without an exaggeration ran as a covert,
parallel power centre.
The book tells you that the KGB
not just penetrated the PMO but also the Press, the CPI, the bureaucracy
and even the Congress party functionaries.
A leading KGB mole in the Indian
media was an influential journalist codenamed NOK who not only routinely
published material favorable to Soviet Union but also provided inside
information on Mrs Gandhi’s plans and her powerful men. The link was
abandoned in 1980 after this Journalist’s health started falling.
After Indira won a landslide
victory in 1971, the politburo established a secret fund of 2.5 million
convertible roubles (Codenamed DEPO) to fund active-measures in India
for four years. KGB also claimed to have helped the success of Congress
(R) in Assembly poll.
In the 1967 election, KGB
subsidized the CPI campaign and also heavily funded several agents and
confidential contacts within the Congress. The most senior agent
identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin was a Minister codenamed ABAD,
regarded by the KGB as ‘extremely influential.’ |
| |
Spies In The
Himalayas
During 1965-1968 there was series of seven
mountaineering expeditions — four to Nanda Devi and three to Nanda Kot –
as part of the most exotic and hazardous intelligence operations of the
cold war, backed by the CIA. During this most unusual mountaineering
venture a group of eminent Sherpas was subjected to tremendous strain,
establishing beyond any doubt that they can stretch themselves to any
limit if they worked under the right leaders.
According to Capt. M. S. Kohli: immediately after the
return of the 1965 Indian Everest Expedition to New Delhi on June 23, I
was asked to lead a covert Himalyan expedition to Nanda Devi involving
leading mountaineers, intelligence officials, nuclear scientists and
dare-devil pilots, drawn from both USA and India.
Our India team included Sonam Gyatso, Harish Rawat,
Sonam Wangyal and G.S. Bhangu – all Everesters. The Americans were
represented by Lute Jerstad, Tom frost, Robert Schaller, Barry Corbet
and a Barry Prather.
After establishing the Base Camp in the Nanda Devi
Sanctuary, and positioning all Indian members and Sherpas, as well as
stores by the middle of September, I gave the green signal to the
Americans to join us. On September 18 the American team arrived in Delhi
on a special flight, carrying sophisticated mountaineering equipment.
Certain items used in space missions, such as space blankets weighing
hardly a few ounces, were being used in a mountaineering expedition for
the first time.
On September 20 there were four helicopter sorties to
the Sanctuary. There were eight more stories during the next three days.
Immediately after their arrival, we started moving up the mountain.
On October 7, the most delicate operation was
performed at the Base Camp. The box containing radioactive fuel rods was
opened and inserted into the generator which along with four other items
of the sensor equipment was to be carried to the summit of Nanda Devi
and installed. The objective was to track the Chinese nuclear
capabilities which were of great concern to both India and the USA.
The nuclear-powered generator was quite hot and would
remain so for nearly 100 years. While the members scared of the radio
contamination kept some distance, the Sherpas snuggled up to the device,
warming their hands and patting their faces.
To monitor any radiation, the Sherpas used to Tiger
Badges, were given white badges to be pinned to the front of their
wind-proof jackets. In the unlikely event of excessive radiation
leakage, the badge would change colour. I advised the Sherpas not to
carry this particular load for more than four hours at a stretch before
passing it off to a colleague.
On October 13, bad weather struck us. There was heavy
snowfall in all caps. Camp-III with 14 climbers and Sherpas lay inactive
and under siege of falling snow. All upward and downward movement came
to a standstill. Lute, Sandy and Tom tried to stir outside the camp but
found it and impossible task, I advised them to stay back. The following
day, however, the weather improved. Out of 14 persons in Camp-III, 13
carried loads to Camp-IV. Out of these, five stayed back at Camp-IV.
They were Da Norbu, Dawa Nurbu, Lhakpa, Nima Dorjee and Kalden. Rawat,
Wangyal, Wangyal II and Pasang Dawa Lama carried loads to Camp-III and
returned to Camp II late at night. I was worried about their safety and
was relieved to find that they were safe.
Our hopes were once again shattered when on October
15 there was heavy snowfall, pinning down climbers and Sherpas once
again to their tents. Sonam Gyatso, who was frostbitten on his back on
Everest, complained of pain on the same spot. I advised him to return to
Camp-II and then move down to Base Camp. The Sherpas at Camp-IV started
feeling miserable.
My diary of October 16 reads: “I spoke to Sherpas in
the morning and persuaded them to stay at higher camps hoping that
weather might improve the following day. Lute had moved up to Camp_II
and spoke to me on the walkies-talkie. He expressed great danger in view
of the continuing snowfall. Considering all aspects I asked all climbers
and Sherpas to move down. Snow continued on the mountain that night, and
conditions were becoming more and more dangerous. The attempt had to be
called off”.
Before leaving, the nuclear equipment was properly
secured at Camp-IV (23,500 feet). Bhangu, who supervised this difficult
task, was certain that it would stay till the summer next when we would
be back to complete the un-finished job.
The Nanda Devi operation had not succeeded. There
were, however, no regrets as we had all done our best and could not have
done any better. The weather gods had conspired to frustrate our first
attempt to install the device on Nanda Devi.
In May 1966, I sent a four-member team of Harish
Rawat (as the leader), Bhangu, Sonam Wangyal II and D.S. Sisodia to
retrieve the equipment. I was asked to stay back at Delhi to keep an eye
on the operations. The team’s brief was to retrieve the equipment and
bring it to the Base Camp where an American expert would be flown to de
fuel the generator before flying the equipment to Delhi. The Same team
of Sherpas would join the second expedition to Nanda Devi.
Beginning its work in full earnest, the team made
quick and satisfactory progress, at least during the initial stages.
Camp I was set up during the next two days. Route to camp II and Camp
III did not present much difficulty. By the end of May, Camp III was
also occupied. Weather remained good, and the ferries were going as
planned.
By June 1, G.S. Bhangu with six Sherpas, which
included Da Norbu, Dorjee and Tashi, reached Camp IV at 1155 hours.
Bhangu rushed to the rock with which he had secured the equipment in
1965. The rock ledge had broken down! There was no sign of the
nuclear-powered generator. For a moment Bhangu stood stunned and
motionless. He frantically looked around. During the winter tons of
fresh snow must have fallen on Nanda Devi. Under its weight the device
must have broken off the rock-ledge and gone down. To where?
This created tremendous concern to both USA and
India. In the event of any leakage to the nuclear equipment millions of
Indians could be affected through Rishi Ganga which drains the Nanda
Devi massif.
The Nanda Devi slopes were soon scoured by the
climbers and Sherpas trying to locate the abandoned device. The Sherpas
had never been used for such work. They took it in this stride and went
about this new task with great sincerity. After several days of
strenuous work, they all drew a blank. The sad news of non-recovery was
flashed to us in Delhi where some emergency meetings were held to take
stock of the situation, and chalk out a further plan of action.
To rub salt on the wound, the weather gods too became
angry. Frequent blizzards and spells of snowfall followed. Sherpas and
porters were in miserable conditions. Bhangu, who had frustrating time
in recruiting porters in Joshimath a month ago, had now once again found
himself in a terrible mess, confronted with the task of persuading and
motivating the Sherpas to continue. Rawat too was in a predicament and
found himself helpless. Sherpas had reached the end of their limit but
continued to work in misery reluctantly.
In the meanwhile Alfa meters and mine detectors were
rushed to the Sanctuary to facilitate the search operations. Extensive
search during the next few days yielded no clues about the generator.
The climbers pondered over various possibilities. Their conclusion was
that the generator had fallen down the mountain slope and probably came
down to the snow fields below, to a height of about 18,000 feet.
After thoroughly searching the area between Camp III
and Camp IV with the mine detectors, Rawat and party also carried out a
mock exercise to recreate the scenario in the event of he generator
having fallen down the mountain slopes. A partially consumed butane gas
cylinder was dropped from camp IV on June 8. it was later found in the
glacier, between the Sanctuary and the Base Camp.
On June 12, disappointed, the second expedition to
Nanda Devi was called off.
After a few days of consultations with the CIA, it
was decided to send a third expedition to Nanda Devi to search for the
missing generator. ‘Operation Recovery’ continued right from the middle
of July until the third week of October, 1966. During these three months
our team made several trips to the mountain. Hundreds of ITBP men
carried loads to the sanctuary from Tapovan.
“Operation Recovery” ended on October 23. Thus the
entire 1966 year was spent in a fruitless and exacting operation, in
difficult conditions. While the members kept shuttling between Delhi and
the Sanctuary, the Sherpas continued facing the music. They had reached
their limit.
After we gave up the search for the nuclear device at
Nanda Devi, the Americans accepted my original proposal to sit up the
monitoring device on the dome of Nanda Kot at a height of nearly 22,000
feet, i.e. 500 feet below the summit. Nanda Kot stood close to Nanda
Devi. I had already climbed this peak in 1959 and knew the route as
well. I was sure there would be no serious difficulty in reaching the
Dome. Besides we could leisurely carry out the installation operation.
Absolute secrecy was maintained for the secret Nanda Kot expedition. The
American team which arrived in March 1967, consisted of two new
climbers, both of the 1963 American Everest team. Tom Frost, Rob Shaller
and Sham Curry of the Nanda Devi returned to join the team.
This expedition was extremely successful and despite
several obstacles we were able to reach the Dome according to our plans
and install the entire plutonium fuelled equipment on the summit on May
30. We got signals from Delhi that the tracking equipment was
functioning well and that we could return. The Sherpas were now on two
mountains. Those who were on Nanda Kot felt elated. They enjoyed
climbing and were thrilled on the success of the Nanda Kot mission. And
those who were still in Nanda Devi on their fourth expedition continued
to work in misery.
Towards the end of August 1967, there was a setback.
The monitoring device on Nanda Kot had stopped functioning. I mounted an
expedition, the second one to Nanda Kot with a few members and by
withdrawing some Sherpas from the nada Devi where the search operation
was still continuing.
On reaching the Dome, we discovered the sensor
equipment buried deep in the snow. After digging, we cleared the snow
and the equipment started working once again. Like the May operations,
the Sherpas who joined this operation once again like the missing
generator. Like the Sherpas I too felt miserable.
During the entire 1966 Expedition, the extended
tussle on Nanda Devi had put the Sherpas under severe pressure. On one
occasion there were signs of mutiny. Though the altitude was not
particularly high, and the weather was relatively warm, the constant
hiking across the rocks was taking heavy toll on their mental and
physical health.
Another problem was that the search was being
haphazard manner. The progress, as a result, was all but impossible.
On the day of our planed evacuation, October 25, 1967
we were hit by heavy snow. Hunkering down for extra day we prayed for
clear skies.
On October 26, however, weather cleared. In the early
morning choppers started landing in the sanctuary and we were ion our
way back home.
And that was not the end of the expedition. News was
received that the sensor equipment on Nanda Kot had stopped functioning
once again. The Sherpas, who were now looking forward to hard earned
rest, ha to go Nanda Kot in the summer of 1967. It was decide to bring
back the nuclear generator,
New satellite options were now becoming available. In
May 1968, the sensor equipment was finally removed and handed over to
the CIA. And thus ended the three year long mountaineering expedition.
The Sherpas, at the end of this mission, proved that
their loyalty and dependability could go much beyond the normal limits
of human endurance.
The moral of the story remained that intelligence is
a necessary evil all modern states engage in. Its achievements and
failures can be colossal and leave on nations red faced. The KGB’s most
shameful failure, for example was when Stalin’s own daughterSuetlana,
escaped from Moscow, stayed in India with the Raja of Kalahandar’s uncle
and then happily left for a refuge in the United States. What were the
master KGB spies Milonosinging doing? At that lime Exercise, they
working for India, the US or for the Soviet Union, who knows. |
|