Russia lays new tracks in Korean ties

Colonialism has left a lot of unwanted baggage in many parts of the world. The relations between Russia and the two Koreas too bear the brunt of history though of late these countries are making every effort to put relations on rails. In its absence it is obvious that the beneficiaries are Japan, China and of course the USA. This explains the hectic pace at which trade ties are being strengthened and new routes opened.

by LEONID PETROV

Following the inauguration of a new president in South Korea, Russia had its own presidential elections on March 2, with Dmitry Medvedev anointed as Vladimir Putin’s successor. In North Korea, it has been reported, the grooming of a new leader is already underway. Nevertheless, the dynamics of relations between Russia and the two Koreas will depend not so much on personalities but on the joint efforts of the sides.

Relations between Russia and Korea in the 20th century were saturated with hopes, victories and disappointments. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) flared up precisely because of control over Korea and ended - for Russia - with the loss of South Sakhalin and ultimately the headache of the (First) Russian Revolution. The revenge of August 1945 and the joint Soviet-American occupation of Korea incurred many political problems.

The creation of two separate states on the Korean Peninsula in 1948 led to the civil and international conflict known as the Korean War (1950-1953), which to this day has not been fully resolved. The Cold War delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and South Korea for four decades, while North Korea even now does not enjoy the diplomatic recognition of the United States and their strategic allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

The understanding of the simple fact that direct contact with both Pyongyang and Seoul gives Moscow special power in resolving serious regional issues did not arrive immediately. Only from the late 1990s did Russia first attempt to make a Korean policy that regarded North and South equally.

Coincidence or not, the major improvement in relations between North and South Korea also happened at that time. In June 2000, the North leader Kim Jong-il for the first time received in Pyongyang the president of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae-jung, and a month later the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin. The foundation of the new “trilateral relationship” was laid precisely then. Soon after that, Kim Jong-il twice visited Russia by train, and the president of South Korea crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separating the two Koreas, by automobile last year.

No sooner had Russia-Korea relations entered a new era than another nuclear crisis burst out on the Korean Peninsula. In October 2002, the United States accused North Korea of secretly enriching uranium. To this allegation more charges were added, such as testing and selling missiles, trading in narcotics and counterfeiting US currency. In the course of this diplomatic row, the economic interests of North and South Korea were impacted. An attempt to resolve the escalating discord was undertaken in the form of six-party talks which opened in Beijing in 2003. At this forum, where former Cold War allies and rivals (the two Koreas, China, the US and Japan) got together, Russia again found itself caught in the crossfire.

It has already been five years since the emergence of the latest Korean nuclear problem (the first was in 1993-1994, until former US president Jimmy Carter brokered a deal), and it remains the stumbling block for the development of the entire region. Despite the temporary diplomatic breakthroughs (in September 2005 and February 2007) the six-party process has not reached its goal. For the international community, to disarm the North remains a “mission impossible”.

Meanwhile, many joint projects and plans endorsed by Moscow, Pyongyang and Seoul remain unaccomplished. It is not difficult to calculate who profits from this and who suffers the loss. The trilateral relationship between Russia, the North and the South include mutually beneficial economic and military collaboration. By freezing this triangle, China and Japan can sit back and relax, while the US will enjoy additional freedom to maneuver in the region.

Where does the commonality of interests lay for Russia and the two Koreas? What projects can be realized in the near future? How can they avoid possible conflicts among themselves and with their competitors in the future? Commonality in understanding the roots of the conflict and principal agreement on the ways leading to its resolution are needed to guarantee peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. To achieve this, the new leaders in Moscow, Seoul and Pyongyang must carefully study the geopolitical map of the region and demonstrate patience and endurance in resolving debatable questions.

Colonialism, World War II and the Cold War are gone but their legacy is a bouquet of unresolved problems. Territorial claims, in one form or another, involve almost all countries adjacent in this region with the exception of Russia and Korea. The Joint Russian Federation-DPRK Commission for the Demarcation of State Borders has recently completed its work by documenting and marking the 17-kilometer frontier. This strip of uninhabited and swampy land in the mouth of the Tumannaya (Tuman-gang) River plays an exceptionally important geopolitical role. It not only provides the two countries with land access to each other, but also prevents Chinese access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

Here, some 50km north of the small port that forms the core of North’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone, the interests of Russia and China are now at stake. Russia is rapidly repairing the railroad track, and China (in a similarly speedy manner) is constructing a new automobile highway, both leading from their respective borders to the port of Rajin. Russia, investing at least 1.75 billion rubles (US$72 million) into this project, seeks to strongly connect Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad. China, in turn, hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to its own territory, offering the efficient network of railroads for delivery of South Korean and Japanese goods to Central Asian and European markets. What position will the government of North Korea take in this clash of ambitions?

The creation of a 128km underground railroad tunnel, which could connect the “Land of the Morning Calm” with the “Land of the Rising Sun”, is recognized as technically possible but could cost a hefty $77 billion. Thus, the transformation of the East Sea into a lake of peace and economic collaboration coincides with the interests of all coastal nations.

A similar truth applies to the trade in petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. In 2007, the volume of the export of “black gold” from Russia to South Korea reached 38.13 million barrels (2.7 times more than in the previous year). The relative proximity of the Russian oil and gas fields is an attractive factor for Korean companies who actively search for alternatives to Middle East oil suppliers. This year South Korea will for the first time start importing natural gas from Russia. The expected volume of delivery during 2008 is 1.5 million tons (or 5.1% of South Korea’s annual demand).

Should there be a special inter-Korean agreement, the delivery of oil and natural gas to the Republic of Korea could be arranged through the North. However, understanding that it will take years before such an agreement is negotiated and signed, the Russian monopoly GAZPROM is now designing an underwater gas pipe going directly to South Korea.

A simple strengthening of economic and military relationships between the three countries will contribute to the peaceful solution of the Korean nuclear problem and prepare the basis for durable peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. If Moscow, Pyongyang and Seoul reach a mutual understanding, coordinate their policies, and preclude their rivals from destroying this unity, the many hopes of the Russian and Korean peoples have a good chance of materializing in the coming four to five years.