THE operation by Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) to flush out three terrorist groups, who had dug their heels in its territory, was effective enough to make large numbers of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the Na-
tional Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), get killed, or caught, or simply scatter and flee to whichever direction possible. Of these groups, particularly the ULFA, had for too long been an absolute menace in Assam and the North-Eastern region as well as the neighbour kingdom, motivating and recruiting other groups to join the ISI network, which, despite the India-Pakistan peace process, is as active as ever.

The demoralisation following RBA’s offensive has had a bit of a domino effect on not only these groups but some others too, some of whose fleeing members got caught in the Indian security dragnet, or surrendered with arms and equipment, in other parts of Assam.

Some ULFA leaders and ranks, who landed up at the Sino-Bhutan border after surviving the RBA operation and requested the Chinese to allow them in for sanctuary, were turned away. After the initial capture by Indian Army, cordoning the India-Bhutan border, and other security forces in Assam, there began a series of surrenders by not only ULFA and NDFB but even roving members of other groups of Tripura and Manipur, where the law and order situation has been at an all-time low since past year, despite the peace negotiation between the Central Government and the NSCN (IM).

The pressure, however, will have to be maintained relentlessly as there are some more menacing moves on. According to a recent report in the South Asia Intelligence Review, headed by KPS Gill, Nepalese Maoist insurgents have been establishing linkages with Indian left-wing extremist groups - most prominently the People’s War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and at least two North-East insurgent groups — ULFA and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). Such subversive activity has once again brought the India-Nepal border management practices under scrutiny. Increasing counter-insurgency operations by Nepalese security forces since the breakdown of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003, have also led to an influx of Maoist insurgents into areas bordering the Indian Territory. Moreover, events in the past suggest that whenever the Nepalese security forces up the ante, Maoist cadres sneak across the largely unmonitored and porous border to find safe haven in India. The India-Nepal ‘open border’ is unique in the sense that people of both the countries can cross it from any point, though there are specific border check-posts as well, including 22 major and 143 sub-posts for bilateral trade. There are, however, six transit points for nationals of other countries, who require entry and exit visas to cross the border. The extremely porous 1,800 km-long border, which has been maintained according to the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, offers uninterrupted passage for illegal smuggling of goods, arms, ammunition and narcotics, as well as human trafficking from either side. Indian security forces began efforts to check the immigrants’ identity cards, citizenship papers and work permits after the IC-814 Indian Airlines hijack from Kathmandu in December 1999. Though some efforts have continued to check the intrusion of subversive elements, they have had little impact at ground level, largely as a result of the unique border arrangements between the two countries. The problem is compounded by the fact that both countries have weak national identity and documentation systems.

Sources in Assam indicated in November 2003 that there was increasing evidence that ULFA was forging links with the Nepalese Maoists and are reported to have recently agreed to have the former operate three new bases in Nepal and share training resources. Earlier reports suggest that ULFA may already have been operating some camps in Nepal in anticipation of the RBA’s operation..

There have been many instances that establish the fact that the Nepalese Maoists have been procuring weapons and are conducting joint training camps along the Bihar-Nepal border. In the recent past, the Maoist movement along the 735 km-long Bihar-Nepal border has been significant in the Sitamarhi, Sheohar and Madhubani districts. Similarly, Darjeeling and Siliguri in West Bengal have also been utilised by the Maoists to establish links with Indian extremists. In another deeply disturbing development, on December 7, 2003, Baburam Bhattarai, chief of the United People’s Front, the ‘political wing’ of the Maoists, claimed that they were trying to ‘organise’ the approximately 10 million Nepalese in India. These Nepalese are primarily concentrated in Sikkim, Darjeeling, Siliguri, Shillong, Dehra Dun, Himachal Pradesh and the Gorakpur-Lucknow belts. It is plausible that much of this ‘organising’ would be routed through the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES), a group proscribed in India under the Prevention of Terrorism Act ( POTA) 2002. The ABNES was originally founded to work for the ‘unity and welfare’ of Nepalese residing in India. Gradually, it evolved into a front organisation for the Nepalese Maoists and is increasingly identified with the demand for a ‘Greater Nepal’, which includes Indian territories. Sources indicate that ABNES secretary Bamdev Chhetri had visited Jammu in September 2001 to establish contact with Kashmiri militant groups in order to set up a supply line for arms for the CPN (Maoist). Chhetri was eventually arrested by Indian authorities in September 2002 and subsequently deported to Nepal. The arrest of Chandra Prakash Gajurel, a member of the Maoist politburo, at Chennai airport in Tamil Nadu in August 2003, when he was trying to travel to Europe to lobby for external support for their cause also needs to be seen in this context.