he
suicide attacks in Riyadh and the change of tactics by the Chechen
rebels seems to form a pattern of escalated terrorism. And since the
U. S. presence is fairly large in Afghanistan, it can be expected that
guerrilla activity over the coming months will increase. There are
enough intelligence reports that the International Islamic Front, a
grouping of Osama's Al-Qaeda and several other terrorist networks has
decided to launch a massive jihad against
the U. S. A. and is increasingly using Afghanistan as a base.
New cells are in place in Afghanistan, Pakistan and
the United Arab Emirates and they will be responsible for carrying out
attacks—including suicide attacks—against U. S. interests in a number
of regions. This will be the new face of Al-Qaeda, which will emerge
soon with a new name and command. The Riyadh episode seems to be their
first step.
The U. S. State Department has confirmed that the
unified command and its Taliban backers will re-emerge in Afghanistan.
Every Al-Qaeda operations officer captured to date
had been involved in some stage of preparation for a terrorist attack
at the time of arrest. Last week, Pakistan announced the arrest of
Khalid bin al-Atash in Karachi, along with some Afghanis and one
Pakistani. Intelligence sources confirmed that Khalid was in fact
arrested near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in Baluchistan. Khalid
was said to be in the process to carry out an attack on Jacobad’s
Shehbaz airbase, which is used by the U. S. Air Force.
Khalid was arrested by members of the U. S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Pakistani law enforcers along with a few
of his Afghani guards and a Pakistani Baloch, who was to be involved
in the attack on the airport. Khalid has been connected to the
Sheraton hotel bomb blast in Karachi last year. He had narrowly
escaped arrest on several occasions.He recently entered Afghanistan
and made some border towns near Pakistan his base. However, U. S.
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that an end to military
operations in Afghanistan was in sight. In the past few months, a
number of people like Khalid have entered Afghanistan, with the desire
to strike against American targets. The emphasis will be on small
operations with a nexus of local groups, and its main tool will be
suicide attacks.
Increasing reports are emerging from Afghanistan of
battles between anti-foreign forces and Afghan militias and U. S.
troops. The main characteristic of the guerrilla attacks has been what
appears to be, for the first time, a consolidated strategy. This is
exactly the same strategy that the Taliban adopted in 1994.
Coincidentally, before they completely took over Kandahar in 1994,
Zabul, Shakin and Argon were their main playing fields.Trade between
Afghan and Pakistan tribes knows no borders.At the same time, the
transport mafias make a mint, so they take exception to U. S. troops
attempting to block them. They want the troops to go, so they are
happy to lend their support to the anti-U. S. commanders along the
Afghan border.
Meanwhile, with the fall of Baghdad, Iran has
become sandwiched between a U. S.-dominated Iraq to the west and
Afghanistan to the east.
The governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, is said to be
playing a pivotal role in the anti-U. S. movement, notably by refusing
U. S. demands to disarm warlords in his area. Khan was one of the more
prominent commanders during the anti-Soviet resistance movement of the
1980s. The revolt he engineered proved to be a turning point in the
anti-Soviet movement in Afghanistan.
When they fled the country in the face of the U.
S.-led troops in early 2002, the Taliban peacefully handed over the
reins of power to Ismail Khan in Herat.
Former Afghan premier and guerrilla leader
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has organised his commanders around Jalalabad and
Kunhar in the east, although he is very much in touch with his loyals
in northern Afghanistan. Mir Arif, the governor of Kunduz, is one of
these. And even though he is an ethnic Uzbek, because he is associated
with Hikmatyar’s Pashtun-orientated Hezb-i-Islami, several Pashtun
warlords support Mir Arif.
This situation gave the U. S. A. a chance to point
a finger at the ISI for its involvement in Afghanistan, and President
Musharraf was quick to put a stop to such behaviour by establishing a
strategic division at General Headquarters Rawalpindi. But already a
large amount of ammunition and money had been moved to the
Hezb-i-Islami commanders.
After the rapid retreat of the Taliban, many Arab,
Chechen and Uzbek fighters took refuge in Pakistan. But with the
recent guerrilla attacks in southeastern Afghanistan virtually making
administration impossible, many of these foreign fighters have
returned.
Given all these factors, it is apparent that the
situation in Afghanistan is not simply one of local unrest, but once
again a potential breeding point and a safe sanctuary for an
international Islamic resistance front against U. S. interests where
already thousands of Arabs, Chechen and Uzbek fighters are fast
regrouping for a broader role in the region to harm the interests of
the
U. S. A. and its allies.