Super
Bazaar, which was once a hub of activity, now wears a grim and eerie look
with its shutters pulled down after the orders of the Central Registrar of
Cooperative Societies from September 5, 2002. A visit to its branch in the
INA Market, which was one of its six regional branches, leads to a
confrontation with the few employees who complain about the ‘injustices’
done to them. The scene is no different at Rajendra Place, where the branch
is open but non-functional.
Super Bazar was set up way back in 1966 to meet the
crisis that developed following the Indo-Pak war. Its objective was to
control rising prices of essential commodities and make quality products
accessible to people at reasonable prices. For more than three decades, it
provided consumer goods, essential commodities of day-to-day life under one
roof, saving customers from the hassle of going to different shops and thus
also saving their time and money. What went wrong with the organisation
which prompted the government to take the extreme step of closing it down?
The same virus that pervades other government
organisations of eroding capital and profits struck this once profit-making
organisation. The government of India has a shareholding of 73 per cent.
Further, it extended loans to Super Bazaar by virtue of which nominations of
the chairman, vice-chairman, managing director and seven other directors of
the Board of Super Bazaar were done. The other side of the sad story is of
how the management, in collusion with elements in the government, brought
about the death of a once glorious institution.
It was making profits till 1996 after a shaky start, but
once losses started surfacing in 1996, it never recovered. By 2000, it was
running at a loss of Rs. 41 crore and in 2002 the accumulated loss reached
Rs. 60 crore.
The first scam exposed in Super Bazaar related to
biscuits which led to a loss of approximately Rs. 9 crore. Super Bazaar was
to supply biscuits to government-run schools for the mid-day meal programme.
According to the rules, the organisation should have floated tenders,
instead, ‘favoured’ suppliers were asked to directly supply the material to
the schools, and in the process everybody made money —starting from the
suppliers to the principals. S. P. Banerjee, former managing director, and
R. D. Srivastav, former deputy general manager, were held guilty by the
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) and departmental action was ordered. As usual, nothing happened.
Banerjee is in Uttar Pradesh, serving as principal secretary in a government
office. In 1997, Ramakant took over as managing director but he too behaved
like his predecessors. During his tenure, the government released wheat to
Super Bazaar at concessional rates. He too entered into a contract for
grinding wheat with a company based in Etawah in Uttar Pradesh. There was no
dearth of millers in Delhi yet Super Bazaar unnecessarily bore the
transportation charges. Even more shocking was that the wheat never returned
to Delhi. When the matter came to the notice of the CVC, it charge-sheeted
many employees and minor penalties were imposed but the real culprits
escaped.
Surinder Singh Dhurri, a former minister, was made
chairman in 1998. His tenure is termed as one of the most corrupt by Super
Bazaar employees. He was appointed by the then Consumer Affairs Minister,
Surjit Singh Barnala, and was his ‘right hand’. Many other politicians were
also appointed as directors on the Board. Lots of irregularities came to
notice vis-a-vis purchase of pulses, onions, potatoes, spices, Swaraj Mazda
trucks, etc. He asked a company manufacturing brooms to supply potatoes!
Irregular appointments were made. According to the report of the Central
Registrar, S. K. Bhoria, during the general election of 1998, prices of
eight types of pulses were reduced for a week, resulting in a loss of Rs.
1.6 crore.
The Central Registrar (CR) enquiry found that losses were
incurred due to excess of manpower, corruption and non-professionalism. It
ordered the recovery of Rs. 48 lakh from Dhurri, then vice-chairman Surender
Singh Gandhi, former director Harcharan Singh Josh, former director Ram
Maheshwari, former director Amarjit Singh Chatwal and deputy general manager
(DGM) Vijay Kumar.
Dhurri’s term ended in October 1999 and Rao joined from
the MCA with P. M. Devdasan who was appointed DGM. At last, Super Bazaar had
an honest officer who took interest in its welfare. Devdasan wrote to the
ministry concerned that the organisation could be revived with a loan of Rs.
10 crore but nobody paid heed. During this time, from October 1999 to
February 2000, Super Bazaar saw an increase in its sale from Rs. 4 crore to
Rs. 7.5 crore per month.
P. Mitra joined as MD in February 2000. He was called a
‘stooge’ of the then Minister of Consumer Affairs Shanta Kumar. He was
specially called from Himachal Pradesh for the task.
According to sources he called the suppliers ‘fools’ and
told them he was not responsible for their money which they were putting in
Super Bazaar, which led to the abandoning of the institution by honest
suppliers. When he joined, the sale was around Rs. 8-10 crore a month, but
it plummeted to Rs. 1 crore. Mitra, during his short term of six months, was
accused of indulging in many corrupt practices but no action was taken
against him.
The Parliamentary Committee on Consumer Affairs in its Thirteenth Report
also recorded its disapproval at the closure of Super Bazaar. It suggested
that it should either be transferred to the National Capital Territory of
Delhi or some willing multi-state cooperative society. It asked for the
early disposal of corruption cases and losses caused to the organisation and
punishment to the guilty.