Good Morning India:Good Luck, Omar Abdullah

Media Pulse

Until only a fortnight ago, almost everyone believed an India-Pakistan war to be imminent. Now no one expects this war to break out. On the contrary, all concerned have welcomed the  "lessening of tensions" between the two neighbours. The measures taken for this purpose by the Vajpayee Government have also received a cheer or two. And yet the manifest dispersal of war clouds has not been followed by the winds of peace. For this there are three principal reasons.

The first and foremost is that everything about the subcontinent’s future depends on the end of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of this country. This hasn’t happened yet though some reduction in this dastardly activity may have taken place, according to Indian sources. Others are even more sanguine on this score. But a definitive judgement cannot be reached until the ground situation is carefully watched for a reasonable length of time.

Since elections in Jammu and Kashmir are due towards the end of September, that roughly seems to be the time of decision. If by then the fundamental condition is actually fulfilled, New Delhi would be willing to consider "de-escalation" of the military deployment along the border and the Line of Control (LOC) and the resumption of the dialogue with Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir.

It is only realistic to acknowledge that the international community is not exactly in sympathy with the Indian position of moving slowly on this point. With the United States of America in the lead, foreign countries are indeed urging this country to respond more quickly to the Pakistani ruler, General Musharraf’s clear commitment to stop all incursions from the Pakistani side into Kashmir. Such pressure is bound to persist as time goes by though there is no cause for South Block to succumb to it.

A second factor—the internal dynamics of Pakistan—complicates and aggravates this already difficult situation. Even those who believe that Musharraf faces no threat either from within the Army or from politicians maintain that he may not be in a position to control all groups, most of which are already accusing him of "betraying" the Kashmir cause. They are also threatening to "continue the 13-year-old jehad" in Kashmir regardless of what Musharraf does or does not do. On the other hand, there are sane voices in Pakistan, raised by commentators not necessarily friendly to India. They are arguing, sensibly enough, that once Musharraf agreed, at America’s instance, to end Pakistan’s support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, continued support to jehadis in Kashmir had become untenable. This undoubtedly is a minority opinion, but the very fact that it exists is significant.

Even more significant is what the Americans are saying and doing against this rather un-enthusing backdrop. The
U. S Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, has played an important role in making his country’s policy on South Asia. He had, in fact, paid a high profile visit to Islamabad and New Delhi ahead of the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. Both had assured this country that because Musharraf had given his commitment to put an end to infiltration of jehadis into Kashmir to the President of the United States of America (and the Prime Minister of Britain) he would have to abide by it for obvious reasons.

However, on the day Rumsfeld was in the region, Armitage in Washington made a public statement to the effect that while Musharraf would surely keep his word, it should not be assumed that terrorist attacks in Kashmir would cease completely. This, according to him, was so because the Pakistani President "could not control" all extremist groups. He then disclosed that he had obtained from India a commitment that in the event of some other horrific act like that at Kaluchak taking place in future, the Indian "response" would not be "disproportionate." This is a diplomatic way of saying that New Delhi would not opt for the "military option."

And this brings me to the third major, indeed decisive, element in the subcontinental situation, America’s hyperactive and profoundly important role in the region. As stated earlier, Musharraf has given no assurance about cross-border terrorism to India directly but only to the U. S. A. It is the Bush Administration that guarantees to this country that Musharraf’s words would be translated into deeds. New Delhi seems inclined to take Washington at its word, but subject to concrete proof on the ground.