Pepe Escobar
NO matter what the spin from Time
magazine’s "man of the year", US President George W Bush,
or defence chief Donald Rumsfeld, there’s one overarching
question facing the 83 entities - nine coalition lists, 47
political parties and 27 individuals, totaling more than
5,000 candidates - now competing for the 275 seats in
Iraq’s interim parliament and that will be entitled to
write the next Iraqi
constitution.
The absolute majority of Iraqis want the Americans out of
their country as soon as possible. But how?
The United Iraqi Alliance - the Shi’ite,
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani - supervised electoral list
(228 candidates) - has a detailed 23-point platform.
According to its main negotiator, Hussein Shahristani, the
platform insists on the "sovereignty, unity and Islamic
identity" of Iraq, and most crucially includes a plan with
a precise date for the end of the military occupation.
Whether the Americans will accept the plan
(neo-conservative dreams for the Middle East collapsing in
the sand), or whether this will be enough to placate Sunni
anger, no one yet knows.
The powerful Sunni association of
Muslim scholars is maintaining its boycott of the
elections. But a few Sunni formations are running, such as
the Islamic Party, an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood
(275 candidates); the independent democrats of former
Ambassador Adnan Pachachi (70 candidates); and the
Democratic National Party of Nassir Chaderchi (12
candida-tes)."Unity" for the moment is a chimera, even
within Shi’ite ranks. With firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
and his movement, the Sadrists, off the electoral list,
the question now is to what extent the Shi’ites will be
able to monopolise the critical mass as the foremost
channel of expression for the disenfranchised. The
Sadrists won’t be part of the next elected, interim
parliament. This means they will be free to constantly
keep the Sistani-endorsed congressmen in check as far as
their crucial point - kicking the Americans out - is
concerned.
Asia Times online sources in Baghdad
confirm that moderate Iraqis - Sunni, Shi’ite, Kurds,
Christians - fear above all the "Liberalisation" of Iraq.
The risk of post-election civil war is immense - as
attested by the proliferation of mono-ethnic and
mono-confessional electoral lists, or the recent bombings
outside the holy Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala. Neo-Ba’athists
active in the Sunni resistance will never accept a United
Iraqi Alliance victory. So there’s a straight confluence
between the strategy of the neo-Ba’athists and the radical
Islamists of Tawhid wa Jihad, Jordanian-born extremist Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi’s movement, helped by up to 2,000 Salafi
jihadis from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria and
Kuwait.
Washington will keep trying in the next
few weeks to push Syria up against a wall - even if
Damascus has nothing to do with Iraqi insurgents. Two
Syrian clerics are being strictly monitored: Imam Abdul
Aziz al-Khatib, from the al-Darwishiya Mosque in Damascus,
and Imam Abu al-Daaqaa, of the Aleppo Mosque. Syria
remains the main jihadi transit point into Iraq for two
reasons: as long as one is a national from an Arab League
country, it’s easy to get a temporary resident visa; and
for the Syrians, it would be next to impossible to survey
their long desert borders with Iraq in the midst of
widespread corruption among border officials.
Washington’s accusations that Iran is
interfering in Iraqi politics are also baseless. A Shi’ite-dominated
Iraq will inevitably entertain good relations with Iran -
but that does not mean it will be subordinated to Tehran,
as Iraqi nationalism plays a much stronger role than
confessionalism, the religious school one follows. There’s
an insistent rumour in Baghdad about the only possibility
for preventing a Shi’ite-dominated government in Iraq: it
would be a coup d’etat concocted by interim Prime Minister
Iyad Allawi and his coterie of co-opted neo-Ba’athists,
backed by the US military, who would then have to face
Shi’ite guerrillas. The neo-cons, in this case, would have
their pliable "Saddam without a mustache" - as Allawi has
been referred to in Baghdad since he took power last June.
But obviously this scenario, from Bush’s "spreading
freedom" point of view, is out of the question.
January 30, 2005, the day slated for
Iraqi elections to be held, could be the thunder and
lightning announcing the start of the Iraqi Civil War. Or,
as many Iraqis convey in their prayers to Allah, it could
lead to an elected Shi’ite-dominated government - but
Iraqi nationalist nevertheless - convincing moderate
Sunnis that their political commitment to the end of the
occupation is more effective than a guerrilla strategy.