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Reining in the warlords Odds against Afghan National Army | |
| By Hooman Peimani | |
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As a joint ANA operation with the American-led coalition forces, operation Warrior Sweep aims at uprooting the resistance forces hidden in south-eastern Paktia province of Afghanistan. The Zermat Valley region is the main operating theatre, according to U. S. Colonel Rodney Davis, who held a press conference at the ANA Pul-i-Charki barracks in Kabul’s vicinity. Located about 100 kilometres south of the Afghan capital, that region was the scene of Operation Anaconda in March 2002. It has since remained a stronghold of the mentioned forces. Based on Davis’ remarks, six ANA companies numbering about 1,000 military personnel are taking part in the operation, which is "in its early stages". Their mission, as he spelled out, is to "kill, capture and deny sanctuary to anti-coalition fighters and to disrupt anti-coalition activity in the Zermat Valley region in support of the Islamic transitional government of Afghanistan". The ANA is still in its infancy. It is weak in terms of training, equipment and weaponry, while lacking the military discipline of an experienced army. Its recruits, who are mainly ex-members of Afghan armed groups, have questionable loyalty to the Karzai government as many of them are reportedly still loyal to their former commanders. The projected strength of the force is 70,000, to be achieved by the end of the decade. The Afghans hope to have a "central core" of 9,000 to 12,000 personnel by next summer. The latter has been evident in slow-paced training since May, 2002 when the American, British and French instructors began training of Afghan recruits in the under-funded and hastily-renovated Afghan Military Academy in Kabul. About 2,700 recruits have since completed their training of 10-week basic infantry skills. They now form eight infantry battalions divided into three brigades, which are all deployed in Kabul. Despite two years of operation, the American-led coalition has failed to root out the Afghan-based Taliban/Al-Qaeda forces. After a few months of retreat in the face of the advancing American forces in late 2001 and early 2002, they managed to regroup to engage the coalition forces in small-scale hit-and-run operations. Such operations have since increased in frequency. Operation Warrior Sweep, according to Davis, is a planned response to this development. While Afghanistan’s newly-established army is conducting its first combat operation, which is a major one judging by its declared objectives, the extent of the American forces’ involvement in this is unknown. However, the experience of the past two years suggests that their extensive use of air power, missiles and heavy weaponry is not the appropriate strategy for winning a guerrilla war like the one waged by the Taliban/Al-Qaeda. Because of its unconventional nature, only a long and land-based operation could severely weaken and eventually eliminate those waging that war, provided the political, economic and social factors contributing to its continuity are also addressed. Apart from its non-military dimension, its military dimension will result in high casualties as expected from a long-term operation against an enemy with a limited military capability in terms of heavy weaponry, personnel and training. It therefore avoids a classic infantry war, which it cannot possibly win due to its weaknesses, in favour of small-scale hit-and-run operations against small groups of its enemies. Given this fact as proven in many similar wars since the end of World War II, Operation Warrior Sweep’s stated mission cannot be achieved in a short period of time. Like any other long war of attrition, this will probably be very expensive in human lives for the poorly-trained ANA, who are now expected to succeed where the well-trained American troops have failed. Apart from its seemingly unachievable objective in the short run, the ongoing operation is important for its political dimension since it demonstrates the Kabul government’s intention to establish its authority beyond Kabul. That authority is currently confined to Kabul as the warlords control almost all the rest of the country, while southern and south-eastern areas along the Pakistani border are becoming the strongholds of the re-emerging Taliban/Al-Qaeda. In such a situation, if the ANA succeeds in controlling the troubled regions such as the Zermat Valley, it will help the government achieve its objective, a necessity for its survival. |
The
newly-established Afghan National Army (ANA) launched its first
military operation called Warrior Sweep. The ongoing operation against
the regrouped Taliban/Al-Qaeda terrorist forces serves as a real test
for the ANA’s military capability. However, given its apparent
weaknesses, its predictable poor performance in a bloody war of
attrition may well damage its shaky structure, along with the residual
credibility of its political master, the administration of President
Hamid Karzai. 
