Musharraf did not like it one bit, but preferred discretion to valour and swallowed the bitter pill administered by the
U. S. A. mercilessly to this "most allied of the allies."

Nobody in New Delhi may lose his sleep over Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s recent visits to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, with stopovers in China, but this apparently shrewd diplomatic move, though not unexpected, has made most political observers sit up and wonder what he is really up to. Is it just that finding himself politically and diplomatically isolated both at home and abroad, the General has sought to break out by choosing two South Asian capitals to launch his anti-India campaign? Or, is there more to it than meets the eye?

That the U. S. A. has also stressed the importance of the forthcoming elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly as a move towards the settlement of the issue and rejected plebiscite as the only means to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people not only marks a 180-degree shift in the super power’s earlier pro-Pakistan stand but also vindicates this country’s long-standing position. And that this latest U. S. position is being supported by not only Britain and the rest of Europe but also almost all the world’s capitals, including those of the ASEAN nations, has all but isolated Pakistan on the issue and compelled it to restrain the jehadis in Kashmir, or at least appear to be doing so.

This diplomatic isolation, on the one hand, and the political isolation within his country because of the dubious nature of the referendum to which he owes his legitimacy, are seen to have compelled Musharraf to bend over backwards in seeking support in the neighbourhood against what Pakistan views as this country’s "hegemonism".

Hence, his appeals to the two nations to take a firm decision on whether they would continue to attend conferences of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) even in the absence of one country. An obvious allusion to India, for the General is obviously trying to pre-empt possible efforts by this country to scuttle Pakistan’s bid to hold the SAARC summit next year, which he evidently considers vital to establish his legitimacy. No wonder, most observers have viewed these anti-India postures as Musharraf’s vain bid to isolate this country in the neighbourhood.

Whatever Musharraf’s other faults, nobody can accuse him of being either naive or unrealistic. In fact, he has displayed a rare capacity to see the writing on the wall without loss of time and promptly adjust his policies accordingly. He has been displaying it regularly since September 11 and has, in the process, lost no time in adjusting his country’s policies to suit the new situation.

And what is the new situation? A careful analysis would show that the post-September 11 developments have not only made the world appreciate India’s position on the question of jehadi terrorism in Kashmir and, thus, isolated Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, but also brought about a fundamental change in its security environment necessitating a complete overhaul of its foreign and security policies.

Islamabad appears to have thoroughly reviewed these policies and appreciated that it could no longer frame them on the basis of its past formulation that it constituted politically and culturally the backwaters of West Asia and that its destiny lay in achieving "strategic depth" by extending its northwest frontiers to the river Oxus and Balkanising India by fomenting and aiding ethnic strife and terrorism in this country.

The U. S. attacks with the help of the Northern Alliance on its own creation of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda, and the Taliban regime, which had given him shelter in Afghanistan, changed the political scenario in Central Asia and across the Durand Line decisively against Pakistan.

Musharraf did not like it one bit, but preferred discretion to valour and swallowed the bitter pill administered by the U. S. A. mercilessly to this "most allied of the allies." And since New Delhi played its cards adroitly, Washington was compelled, albeit gradually, to correct its South Asia policy and appreciate that it could not carry on a global war against terrorism without jettisoning its support for anti-Indian terrorism in Kashmir in the name of "liberation war." It may not sacrifice its long-term ally but could no longer support its adventurism unreservedly.

It was this change in the geopolitical scenario that dramatically changed Pakistan’s security environment and put paid to its adventurist ambitions of achieving strategic depth by controlling Afghanistan through Pashtun-dominated regimes and Balkanising India by fomenting terrorism in this country.

That Pakistan has realised the implications of this change has been obvious for the past many months. Its undertaking to put an end to cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and Musharraf’s latest exertions, however, seem to suggest that it has also reconciled itself to the inevitable proposition of accepting a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue.

Similarly, it appears to have reconciled itself also to the fact that it is essentially a part of the South Asian region, and neither politically nor historically or culturally that of West or Central Asia. Hence, Musharraf’s keenness to play a major role in the SAARC that flies against Pakistan’s efforts hitherto to slow the pace of its development and thwart all efforts aimed at the ultimate economic integration of the South Asian region.

That Musharraf should try to win the support of this country’s smaller neighbours and gang up with them against it is to be expected. Most of them are jealous of India’s strength and resent its "big brotherly" attitude. That does not, however, push them out of the South Asian region or stand in the way of the economic integration of South Asia. Nor need Pakistan’s differences with this country do that.

That India is the big brother in the region goes without saying. It would be absurd of any of its neighbours to expect it to reduce its size or weaken its economic or military strength just to please them. They could, and should, however, expect this country to behave magnanimously and go even out of the way to make some sacrifices to accommodate the younger siblings.

The public opinion in this country, too, needs to be accommodative of the wishes and aspirations of the smaller neighbours. Let nobody worry about Pakistan’s efforts to rally other smaller neighbours against this country on genuine issues of concern to any of them, so long as it remains committed to the position that its future rests within the South Asian region. Quarrels in the family do not weaken it so long as all its members are committed to resolving them within the family fold.