New threat from the South

by M. K. Dhar

Understandably India is reluctant to get involved in the affairs of Sri Lanka but the emerging new threat from the South has made the Government of India to rethink and be more vigilant. The air capability of the LTTE has come as a shock but it has brought to the centre stage the fact material in and out of India is being ferried unhindered. With its past record this can only be allowed to continue by jeopardizing the security of the country.

Certain disquieting developments in Sri Lanka in the past few weeks have induced serious thinking among the Indian strategic community about the emerging threat to the country's southern maritime boundary from the naval and air arms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.   Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse who, during the recent SAARC – related visit, could not persuade New Delhi to get involved in the ethnic conflict in his country, however, succeeded in securing assurances about coordinated naval patrolling of the Palk Strait.   The intention is to prevent smuggling of arms and other critical materials to either country and to protect the rights of Indian fishermen, who often have complained of harassment at the hands of a nervous and trigger-happy Sri Lankan Navy.

The activities of LTTE Sea Tigers involved in ferrying weapons and other needed materials and their encounters with the Sri Lankan Navy are known for many years.   But, it is only recently that the LTTE's air capability, however small, surfaced for the first time when two small aircraft bombed Katunayake air base 37 km from Colombo and returned to base safely, sending shock waves through the security establishments in Colombo and New Delhi.   Obviously, due to intelligence failure, the Sri Lankan Government was unaware of the LTTE aircraft, the air-strip and the base facilities they used.   Hence, it was unable to use its Air Force to knock out these facilities and deprive the rebels of their new capability.

More disquieting are reports that the LTTE has been trying to establish links with various terrorist organizations operating from different parts of India and supplying them weapons through the sea-route in exchange for cash.   The Maoists operating in several states, as well as, ULFA are known to source their arms supplies from the LTTE also.   The Indian Coast Guard has intercepted several consignments of arms and ammunition meant for these and other militant outfits.   The more serious implication of the development has been that it takes war to the hitherto safe region of India which had not been war gamed or programmed in the security establishment and is now bound to entail additional defence-related expenditure.  

With minimal equipment the LTTE Sea Tigers have been able to inflict considerable damage to the Sri Lankan Navy.   The estimated strength of the Sea Tigers varies from 2500 to 3000.  The LTTE has a large number of merchant ships from various countries used for the purpose of smuggling of weapons and other equipment.   Some of these ships have been intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy from time to time and large quantities of arms and ammunition recovered.  The strength of the Sri Lankan Navy is below 30,000 and only recently it was upgraded to the first line of defence.   Considering the enormity of the task before it, of guarding the sea and vital port facilities and fighting the Sea Tigers at sea, the Navy is ill-equipped for the task.   Therefore, it has been desperately trying to involve the Indian Navy in the task of sea patrolling.   The combined strength of the Sri Lankan Army   and the police, of some 150,000 (with a high desertion rate) also is not adequate to deal with the LTTE guerillas on the ground or to prevent suicide missions which have inflicted considerable damage.

Tamil Nadu fishermen have been complaining of harassment by the Sri Lankan Navy, which often mistakes them for smugglers, fires at them and even takes them prisoner.   Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi has often complained to the Centre against the high-handedness of the Sri Lankan Navy, which led to top officers of the Coast Guard and the Coastal Security Group visiting the area in the international maritime boundary line in the Palk Strait.   The Sri Lankan Navy has produced evidence of Indian fishermen sometimes taking to smuggling of strategic materials for the LTTE.  The seizures included large quantities of ball-bearings meant for use in landmines, aluminium bars and metal rings.   The Indian Navy also seized a few country boats laden with materials for smuggling into Sri Lanka, obviously for use by the LTTE.

Though the Indian Government has agreed to give more assistance to the Sri Lankan security forces, it will be restricted to defensive capabilities.   There is considerable public pressure on the Government from the Tamil –speaking people to stop its security cooperation with Colombo which has been reluctant to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil minority in the island republic.   Though New Delhi has labeled LTTE a terrorist organisation and its supremo V. Prabhakaran is a wanted criminal following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, it does not want to be seen as supporting the Sri Lankan Government in the operation to suppress Tamil aspirations, though it is committed to Sri Lankan's territorial integrity.

At the same time, New Delhi cannot remain a silent spectator to the ongoing developments as a surge in LTTE's morale would not only encourage insurgents like the ULFA and Maoists but also groups, such as, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Harkatul Jehad-e-Islami, which are suspected of having close connections with some Pakistan-based terrorist organizations which are banned by the US and other countries.   The surfacing of LTTE's air arm adds another dimension to the threat.  The LTTE is reported to have been using four modified Czech-built Zin-143 aircraft and two helicopters from an airstrip near Iranamadu and Mullaitivu, where the Indian Peacekeeping Force had unearthed and destroyed a factory for manufacturing micro-light aircraft nearly two decades ago.   The planes used in the attack had local fixtures attached to the airframe to allow automatic weapon discharge of four gravity bombs.  Brought in dismantled conditions, these aircraft were put together in the north-east.

Formation of the Air Wing (Vaanpuligal) was the work of Shankar alias V. Somalingnam, an aeronautical engineer with Air Canada before his retirement and held an aeronautics engineering degree.   He did the groundwork for the formation of the Air Tigers.  LTTE Chief Prabhakaran's son, Charles Anthony, who presently heads the force is also an aeronautical engineer.   Even micro light aircraft can be converted into lethal flying bomb, carry upto 30 kg of high explosives and cover a distance of 500 km to drop its payload.   Its use of favourable air currents and glider design ensures maximum fuel economy and also increases its operational range.  The LTTE seems to be also trying with the idea of using such aircraft on suicide missions, perhaps, with a modified version which can carry a slightly larger payload.

The LTTE is also said to be planning to acquire an under-water capability, though it is not easy to secure a conventional submarine, however small.   But smaller submersible vessels, used for research purposes and deep-sea diving, could be used to begin with.  There are many retired personnel familiar with submarine facilities who could train the LTTE cadre, once a facility becomes available.   Like the Czech aircraft it has acquired and made operational, the LTTE might get the submersible craft in dismantled condition and put it together at one of its naval facilities from where the Sea Tigers operate.   Once acquired, such vessel can pose a threat to merchant shipping in regional waters.  Iran and North Korea have already developed, or acquired, mini-submarines for commando operations.

India has denied that it supplied defective radars to Sri Lanka which failed to detect the intrusion and bombing by the LTTE aircraft.   Official inquiries reveal that the two transportable Indira Radars for detection of low flying aircraft last year as part of military assistance and installed at the Katunayake air base had been shut off before the LTTE aircraft intruded into the area.   There is a strong suspicion on either connivance of the ground staff at the base, or information having been passed on to the LTTE regarding the radar shut-down.   Even information about direction of the radar and the height below which it is inoperative, such as, tree-top, would also be useful for the raiders.

Considering the security implications of the developments in Sri Lanka and the new capabilities of the LTTE, the Government of India should take no chances with tightening up vigil all over the southern peninsula.   Forces hostile to the country can go to any extent to open more fronts in order to harass the Indian security forces and bring about their deployment in hitherto uncovered areas by stretching manpower and resources.   However, the Indian Air Force has set up eight radars on the Tamil Nadu coast to monitor the air space and plans to set up an air base in the area also in the near future.

The IAF may also acquire tethered radar systems used in the western and northern border areas to fill the gap in the airspace that conventional radars cannot cover.   It may also consider stationing of elements of fighter aircraft in the forward southern bases to meet with any emergency.  At the same time, New Delhi would keep up pressure on Colombo to intensify efforts to find a negotiated settlement of the ethnic issue which safeguards the interests of the Tamils.